Now that we have all of the organizational elements kind of mapped out in some terms for this case, let's start to think about the analysis. So again, let's start with the first era of Mayor Washington. Let's apply each of our models to the case of Mayor Washington and his effort at reform, the centralized effort. So, the first phase here. The anti-bureaucracy that kind of waxes and wains. If we applied the rational actor model we would have a focus on particular actors like Washington in the Chicago public schools. The core problem would be low performing schools. The action is rational choice would break things down as follows, if there is a goal which is to reform the schools and get rid of red tape, that was regarded as the problem that was preventing achievement and preventing buy-in in schools. The various options that they could consider were, let's fight this reform effort or fight each other in terms of seeing what kinds of resources of allocated where. So the legislature versus the businesses and what not. They could form a coalition is another option between IBEC and the local school councils. The Democrats could form a coalition with community activists and dominate, because the Democrats were in charge. But there are clear consequences to each of these options. So, if you fight between groups, or interest, you know consensus is had, and that just create a difficult environment for every side. If you form a coalition, and take action like with the IBEC and local school councils that makes some sense. There may be certain kinds of costs to that. It may offend the legislature in power, don't know. I don't know what the risks or the probabilities of success are here. There's some ambiguity and I'm boundedly rational. Another option is the legislature rejects everything. If we don't try to work with the Republican minority you may not get any money. It may not get allocated. There may be a filibuster for all I know. And so, to some degree, we can kind of predict how certain camps will behave depending on the kind of options before them. So the choice and using this model, if we were to apply it, might be that it provides us some insight into why the coalition of IBEC and the local school councils arises. That you have this kind of grassroots business and community kind of collaboration. And it serves kind of as an anti-bureaucratic kind of localized effort. So it might be the most viable choice that avoids kind of lack of consensus or even kind of domination of one group over another, these are the constituents of legislatures after all. Now if we look at an organizational process model it's not as clear that this case or their write ups afford much detail. They don't discuss standard operating procedures to a great deal. So we kind of have to infer some of this. Now, the organizations involved are things like the Mayor office, the legislator, the Union, IBEC, SBNC. All those features that you saw on that table before. And we can imagine that the problem is broken up, so the problem of low-performing schools, or red tape that's in the way, it's inefficient. That the local school councils, they break up the problem and they reform and so they can handle it locally, for example. So instead of it being an entire Chicago problem, it's actually these little district problems. So that's actually kind of how it went down. The missions vary and the local school councils move by their own standard operating procedures. So what happens when you decentralize a problem and you coordinate locally is that each of these pockets kind of comes up with it's own way of dealing with things. And you divergence of standards and often it's not replicable in another community. So costs soar to some degree and the coordination across them grows difficult. It appeals to the local context but it doesn't necessarily make for an efficiency solution. But if we apply coalition and bargaining, well, we have a different perspective as well. So we have to think about the players and their positions. So IBEC and community activists have parochial interest. The IBEC wants business, the community activists want their kind of communities to do well. So they kind of were unlikely bed fellows in a way because the community activists wanted to generate their neighborhoods and families and serve the interests of the local schools. IBEC might actually not have such localized interests if you think about them as larger corporations within Chicago, but this seemed to be that they had the redevelopment of Chicago in mind as a means of not only making for better schools and trained employees, but also for better business. So in some ways, they kind of, even though the community activists might have been very clearly liberal democrats and business leaders, Republicans formed kind of a set of joint interests that they could form a coalition around. Now the parochial priorities is that the business leaders wanted to implement Reaganomics which was kind of a hot thing back in that day, and which is kind of less government, less etc., idea. And the local school councils really sought greater control or power, they wanted to be the masters of their own destiny in their neighborhood so their neighborhood schools. And so these were kind of similar but parochial priorities that were somewhat distinct. Goals and interests, the goals and interests were a better city for business, better schools for educators, students and families. So those were kind of common goals during this period. The deadline, and this is all I'm just rattling off things that each model will press you to perceive. Or demand that you consider. So in terms of developing that kind of perspective of world view, I'm just kind of listing these off. So the deadline, of course, is in the case of the first period is that Mayor Washington dies. It's an untimely death and unexpected. And this led to a new election and a shift toward recognizing problems and what have you. In addition there were different games going on during this period, so there was negotiating legislation of power and implementation work implementing local school councils. Dealing with who gets to handle the budgets. These were kind of different concerns. There was a problem with decoupling, and resource allocation to some extent. So, the decoupling from power and regulation, and then resource allocation of funds. And implementation, so there was this kind of series of distinctive games that one might have been more prepared for like power sharing and legislation of power. But not prepared for the implementation in the fact of assessing or seeing whether this local school councils, the coalition actually was effective in making school better performing. So they seemed to be better in that first phase than the latter. So let's consider Mayor Daley's era as well. So here we have managerialism right. So of course, Mayor Washington dies and then we have this real, the selection and Mayor Daley comes in the office and the same time the legislature in Illinois turns Republican, etc., etc. And all kinds of other problems. Like a fiscal crisis is occurring in Illinois, and for Chicago at that time. And so, they had to decide where to put their dimes, and what would be the most effective means. So if we took a rational actor view, here Daley in the Chicago Public Schools system was centralized. So it's a much more unitary actor. The problem was the schools are broken, they're not very good in spite of having these centralized structures. So as a rational choice model the goal is to reform them for results and accountability to make them better, and Daley's options were he could coordinate with business and dominate. He could fall back on a prior alliance between local school councils etc. And the consequences of each choice or each kind of option was different so if he gets kind of certain options he'll get money, he might be able to take action if he falls in the prior alliance with local school councils. The legislature might reject his ideas or his efforts in the Chicago schools and no action is taken without funds. So it was clear that he had to do some kind of distinctive coalition or distinct kind of decision here. And the choice was obvious to go with a more centralized coalition with business leaders and a means of accountability that was more efficient than managerial than a local decentralized school council effort. Then the organizational process model, of course, had all kinds of organizations involved. So if we apply this kind of model here we start to see things very differently. The business leaders, of course, fell back on their own standard operating procedures. That's where they came up with managerialism. They didn't adopt the perspective or the standard operating procedures of the school system instead they adopted the kinds of procedures they used for managing businesses. And so, they basically fell back on standard operating procedures they were familiar with. There is a disconnect in the view of standard operating procedures or an error in using them. So, this kind of creates problems. So the educators didn't understand the standard operating procedures that business leaders wanted to impose on the education system, and in addition, the lack of education experts at the top of the managerial system led to kind of decoupling of understandings and familiarity with the routines. So from an organizational standpoint, this later period of mismatch across organizations and organizational routines from different kinds of leaders kind of helps explain the phenomenon. And then finally, a coalition bargaining perspective, also highlights certain things. So here we see that certain players and positions matter. The Republican legislature and IBEC kind of form, they propose the reform and they form a coalition of interest, and the Mayor kind of plays into this and is given power. This completely undermines the community activists. They're pushed out so, and the Mayor coops the Union leaders in various ways as you read the case. There are parochial priorities going on so IBEC, schools, and are for business and they're concerned with an economic model. They feel that an educational model and community activism failed so that this new model should work. So they impose and regulate. So as the environment and power shifts so does the emphasize on different goals. So in each phase when there is an election, you see the Mayor fall back into a more parochial interests and then once its over there are other kinds of groups parochial interests come into play. So there is a little bit more of a dynamic. It's not just an organization as an actor. It's an organization as having shifting interest, depending on the timing and the parochial interests of those leaders. So the deadline, of course, here using coalition and bargaining are these different elections, contract renewals, fiscal years when the budgets get done. Those things kind of have these punctuated effects on relationships and interests. Now the game, there's various games at foot like how people will bargain with each other. That's the kind of the idea of coalition or the bureaucratic politics model. So what we see is in the initial period is that the game is to gain power that the legislature wants to form this kind of reform that will change the system for the better and centralize authority, and if they give money to the Mayor that they can hold the Mayor accountable. And if he fails, he can be stopped from reelection, etc. In the later phase, decoupling actually helped so instead of linking things closely in the first phase now in the second because if things don't go well if they don't show results that will fit the accountability model. They start to hide it, and this starts to reveal that the business model is flawed, so they try not to show that and through interactions with the media and press reports they try to withhold certain kinds of information that might show that the model was not as effective and this probe interest. The Mayor's trying to get re-elected and so are politicians. And so it's not just a matter of meeting the goals or enacting operate standard operating procedures that fit different groups. Now it becomes adapting the kind of implementation for different purposes and the reporting of the accomplishments for different purposes. Then maybe are the shared goals of all the actors in that coalition or in that group. It may fit certain ones at certain times more than others. So each model kind of has an applicability here, and if we line them up again, we can see kind of how they all compare and which ones seem to have certain narratives and certain eras over others. So again, we come to this question of, which works best? And I think this is a great case where we can use the forum of the course to ponder this question. We can ask things like, does the rational actor work better in a centralized phase, like Daley's? Or this rational actor/model only superficially apply. And most the decisions followed an organizational process model of heuristics and routines. For those of you taking the advanced track of this course, you get the chance to review a series of papers or grade them, that actually apply theories to this case, the case of the Chicago Public Schools. And there, you'll see the author is trying to answer this questions. So rather than me telling you what the right answer is, I think it's best to leave it up and see how you guys kind of negotiate trying to implement these theories to actual cases and seeing evidence for one over the other. And possibly arguing that these theories might work either at different phases or circumstances. Or as compliments in some way to one another to afford a richer understanding of how this Chicago Public School reform manifested and died in each phase. And also just how possibly those kinds of perspectives might enable you as a manager to think more completely about a problem and plan for the best and worst. Thanks.
