So, you've now gotten three different theories in this course. And they've been applied to a case of the Cuban Missile Crisis. And of course, this, this is merely just a reflection of, of the, argument that Graham Alison made in, in his text. It's very effective, I think, because here you see three different theories lined up next to each other and compared. And some kind of characterization of what they draw out about the phenomenon versus myths. So, each perspective makes certain assumptions, make certain views more prevalent than others. So, now we kind of come to, a simple question, which probably has been on the minds of most of you, which is which, which perspective or theory works best? Every model has short comings, right? So. You know, do the reasons for choice, when the rational actor model here, you know. Do those reasons explain its occurrence in acti, in action? So, in some ways, you have to ask yourself as a rational actor model, does it, exaggerate agency? To the point where it's oversimplified that Kennedy commanded these things. They met as a group, a unitary actor made a decision. Are, are those valid assumptions, right? Another thing to ask with the organizational process model is that, does path dependence fail to explain change, so things changed in the crisis. Organizations didn't just evoke the routine, they adapted the routines. They negotiated them people select in which routine to use and what they thought was optimal to some degree. So, it wasn't purely organizational process or purely rational actor perhaps. With the bureaucratic politics model, we have to ask, how much information is needed to make that a feasible perspective? Is it just too much data that we need? We would need to know that wrangling, the interactions, between these individuals in ExComm. What, how much would we have, how deep would we have to go? It's interesting that a colleague of mine at Princeton right now just wrote a book on the Cuban missile crisis, where he took the actual transcripts of those discussions, they were all audio taped. And he's actually analyzed how different futures are projected, and how people argue for or against. So, it's much more detailed, but it affords some window into the bureaucratic politics model, to a degree. The question I start to wonder about with these theories is they, do they particularly apply to certain kinds of circumstances, more to some or than, others? And, I kind of wonder at times if, the rational actor model, because it's an idealized kind of model that's overly simplistic, if it's great for planning to some extreme. To some degree, so it's perspective in terms of what we can try to rationally plan out ahead. The reactive crisis, tend to follow an organizational process view, I, I, I wonder, in the sense that [COUGH] something happens and organizations are in place to respond and they usually fall back on something that they've done before that's closest and they need to do so immediately. So, an organizational process model may apply there. And then, changing a tentative decision. So, say that you've begun to do a reform or try to implement a procedure, the bureaucratic process model may be suitable to actually fine tuning or wrangling with that decision so that certain individuals respond to that enactment in that organizational environment. And try to forward it or redirect it in a different direction so that it's more applicable or effective in its functioning. So, I can see these different perspectives having different circumstances under which they could potentially apply well. So, each of our models has short comings. And it's feasible that each of our models could apply more or be more successful in explaining certain circumstances or phases of organizational behavior. However, it's also feasible that they might compliment one another, right? And this is actually Allison's argument that he reflects on these three organizational theories and how well they applied to the Cuban Missile Crisis and he kind of came down on the idea that maybe they could be nested. Or integrated in a way that was useful. So, he viewed Model one as, as simplified and it, it renders things into a single national actor. Where it's focused on a problem, looks at incentives and decision points and fixes the context around it and then larger national patterns. So, it's simplified, but it's useful and it's actually the way we often describe events, we in newspaper articles and what have you, right? But within this context, Allison believes that model two, the organizational process model, illuminates the organizational routines that produce or collect information, that generate alternatives for action. And the actual enactment of that action. So, he, he views this as, the organizational process model as something that elaborates what the, the simplified rational actor model, but he goes further. He then says that model three or the, the bureaucratic process model can be even embedded in the context of the organizational process model. And it gives more detail on the individual leaders and the politics among them that determine their major choices. So it affords more of a a nitty gritty, bargaining and negotiation process within this world of routines and matching, within a world of strategic action and, and identification of problems and incentives. So, he, he thinks they actually work best when synthesized. So, here you have different ways of thinking about how these models can be applied, how well they do so. Not only that, what circumstances they may better apply than in others, as well as possibly how they could be integrated into affording a more nuanced and complete understanding of a phenomenon, and possibly how we can end manage it in the future.